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1. Introduction 
The design of the “Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act” (hereinafter Dodd-Frank) has been heralded as a turning point in the regulation 
of derivatives markets. In particular, the provisions included in Title VII of the 2,300 
pages long legislation overturned the decision taken a decade earlier by the US 
Congress to exempt OTC derivatives markets from federal regulatory oversight, a 
step that was subsequently recognized as contributing to the financial crisis.2 Dodd-
Frank introduced a comprehensive regulatory framework which brought for first time 
under the direct oversight of US regulators a broad range of actors and products that 
constitute the modern derivatives markets.  
																																																								
1 I am extremely grateful to the research assistance of Alexandra Laue that has helped make the data 
collection possible. I also would like to thank Christopher Gandrud and Kevin Young for their help in 
the analysis of the data, and all the participants the workshop "The Politics of Regulating Global 
Derivatives Markets After the 2008 Crisis" at the Balsillie School of International Affairs (September 
19, 2015) for their comments and feedback on the previous draft of this paper. 
2 FCIC, 2011 
While the signing of the Dodd-Frank Act into federal law by President Barack 
Obama in July 2010 has received considerable attention, this represented only an 
intermediate step in the process of reforming the regulation of derivatives markets in 
the US after the crisis. Equally important in in defining the true impact and 
effectiveness of the post-crisis reforms was the implementation of the same Dodd-
Frank by US regulatory agencies. In the case of Dodd-Frank derivatives rules, the 
centrality of the implementation phase was heightened by the significant latitude that 
the primary legislation designed by the US Congress granted regulators in defining 
how derivatives markets should be regulated. As a result, before the ink of Dodd-
Frank had even dried, critics of the legislation had identified in the implementation 
stage a key opportunity to amend and potentially turn the clock back on some of the 
measures introduced by Congress to regulate derivatives markets.  
This chapter will investigate the implementation of Dodd-Frank derivatives 
rules between 2010 and 2015 and argue that this phase brought to a halt the tightening 
in the regulation of derivatives markets that had been set in motion by financial crisis. 
In particular, the analysis will highlight how in a number of areas the implementation 
phase has led to a narrowing of the scope of the regulatory net casted by Dodd-Frank 
over derivatives markets, by excluding a number of actors and transactions from 
regulatory requirements mandated by Congress, as well as by watering down the 
stringency of these requirements. At the same, this whittling down of Dodd-Frank 
derivatives rules has not been uniform. In a number of instances, regulators have been 
able to resist pressures to relax the regulatory requirements and to implement Dodd-
Frank without departing from their original proposal. 
What explains this outcome? Why have regulators implemented the 
Congressional mandate in narrow ways in some areas while expanding the scope of 
the regulation in others? In order to answer these questions, this chapter will explore 
the diversity of interest groups within and outside the financial industry that have 
mobilized during the implementation stage. The argument put forward in this chapter 
is that the capacity of regulators to withstand pressures to whittle down the scope and 
strictness of Dodd-Frank during the implementation phase has been influenced by the 
breadth and cohesiveness of the opposition front among different interest groups. 
More specifically, the presence of a cohesive opposition front from different groups 
from within and outside the financial industry to certain rules has weakened the 
capacity of regulators to defend to their original proposal and increased the threat of 
Congress intervening to curtail the autonomy of regulators. By contrast, the presence 
of disagreements across interest groups has created policy space for regulators to 
withstand calls for these rules to be watered down.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 will provide an overview of the 
main trends in the regulation of derivatives markets in the US before and after the 
signing of Dodd-Frank into federal law. Section 3 will review the ecology of interest 
groups that have mobilized during the implementation of Dodd-Frank and map the 
different patterns of conflict and coalitions emerged. The second part of the chapter 
will illustrate the impact of this mobilization over the rule-making process by 
analyzing three key sites of conflict that have characterized the implementation of 
Dodd-Frank’ derivatives rules: the definition of swap dealers and major swap 
participants (Section 4), the regulation of clearinghouses (Section 5) and the 
regulation of swap trading platforms (Section 6). 
 
2. The political economy of Dodd-Frank derivatives reforms: a tale of two halves 
The regulation of financial markets is often far from resembling a linear 
process. The extent to which policymakers have intervened to regulate different 
financial sectors and products has often alternated between periods of deregulation 
and re-regulation. This cyclical characterization of financial regulatory policymaking 
also describes quite well the evolution of the regulation of derivatives markets in the 
US over the last few decades. 
The regulation of OTC derivatives in the US in the decades preceding the 
global financial crisis was characterized by a number of regulatory decisions to free 
different segments of derivatives markets from regulatory constraint, despite the 
numerous warning signs regarding the potential risks posed by OTC derivatives 
markets activities remaining outside of the oversight of federal regulators.3 This trend 
culminated in the passage of the “Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000” 
when the US Congress eliminated oversight by both the CFTC and SEC over OTC 
derivatives markets, effectively shielding OTC derivatives from the direct reach of 
regulators.4 
As the global financial crisis a decade later led policymakers to question the 
desirability of this decision, the regulation of derivatives markets has returned on the 
Congressional agenda. Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the bailout of 
AIG, a number of legislative proposals were introduced within Congress to revise the 
decisions taken in the 1990s to exclusion derivatives markets from regulatory 
oversight and - in the words of Sen. Harkin - to “end the unregulated ‘casino 
capitalism’ that has turned the swaps industry into a ticking time bomb”.5  The Dodd-
Frank Act passed by the US Congress in June 2010 required the main participants and 
infrastructures in the derivatives markets (such as clearinghouses, trade execution 
facilities, and trade repositories) to register with federal regulators as well as to be 
subject to variety of regulatory requirements. Moreover, the scope of the bill was not 
limited to regulating credit derivatives at the center of the crisis, but rather it 
encompassed nearly all commonly traded OTC derivatives, including derivatives on 
interest rates, currencies, commodities, securities, indices, and various other financial 
or economic interests or property. In so doing, Dodd-Frank represented a reversal of 																																																								
3 Spagna (this volume). See also GAO, 1994  
4 Tett, 2009; FCIC, 2011, p. 48 
5 Snow, 2008 
the de-regulatory approach that had characterized the fifteen years preceding the 
crisis. 
The signing of the Dodd-Frank Act into law by President Barack Obama in 
July 2010 did not, however, represent the end of the post-crisis regulation of 
derivatives in the US. As CFTC Chairman Gensler stated in July 2010, “Even after 
the President signs the Wall Street reform bill, financial reform will be far from 
complete”.6 The legislation approved by Congress delegated significant rule-making 
responsibilities to the hands of federal regulatory agencies, granting them a 
significant amount of discretion in defining what market actors and products would 
be covered by the regulatory requirements established in the legislation, as well as the 
level of stringency of these requirements. As a result, groups that had expressed 
discontent with the formulation of Dodd-Frank identified in the implementation stage 
as an opportunity to whittle down or rectify some of the provisions introduced by 
Congress. As Gensler acknowledged in October 2011, “a year after the Dodd-Frank 
reforms became law, there are those who might like to roll them back and put us back 
in the regulatory environment that led to the crisis three years ago”.7  
Gensler’s remarks were directed in particular towards those major actors within the 
financial industry that maintained a vested interest in limiting the regulatory burden 
imposed upon OTC derivatives markets. In the years before the crisis, key market 
players and financial industry associations such as the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association had played a primary role in lobbying Congress to keep these 
markets outside of the scope of official regulation.8 The high political salience that 
characterized financial regulation during the financial crisis had constrained the 
influence of the financial industry over the design Dodd-Frank and forced key 
derivatives markets players to fight largely a rear-guard battle and to endorse many of 
																																																								
6 Gensler, 2010 
7 Gensler, 2011  
8 Tett, 2009 Tsingou, 2006 McKeen-Edwards & Porter, 2013 
the regulatory proposal presented.9 Now, the leverage of those groups with an interest 
in water down of the Dodd-Frank rules was significantly bolstered during the 
implementation stage as a result of three important changes in the policymaking 
context in which these rules were created. 
A first set of constraints on the implementation of Dodd-Frank derivatives 
rules can be found in the characteristics of the institutional context in which these 
rules were implemented. Congress gave the primary responsibility for developing the 
around 60 pieces of regulations required to implement Dodd-Frank’s derivatives rules 
within a stringent timeline to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), a 
relatively small regulatory agency with no experience of regulating OTC markets, but 
denied this agency the resources required to police this market. As Gensler argued, 
“The CFTC's...staff is just 10% more in numbers than at our peak in the 1990s, yet 
Congress has now directed the agency to oversee the swaps markets; that is eight 
times larger than the futures market." 10 The gap between the herculean task involved 
in implementing Dodd-Frank and the limited resources of regulators has contributed 
significantly towards slowing down the implementation process as well as increased 
the reliance of regulators on the expertise of the financial industry.  
Moreover, Dodd-Frank required the CFTC to develop a number of rules in 
coordination with other regulatory agencies. During the implementation phase, the 
CFTC has found itself clashing with other regulatory agencies such as the SEC (for 
example, on the threshold for determining swap dealers, the regulatory standards to 
be applied to swap trading platforms, as well as the application of rules to cross-
border transactions), banking regulators (on the application of margin requirements to 
non-financial end-users) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. As a result, 
the conflict among the different regulatory agencies involved in the implementation 
of Dodd-Frank has taken place have created additional opportunities for firms seeking 																																																								
9 Young, 2013a 
10 Natural Gas Intelligence, 2012 
to whittle down the stringency of these rules by exploiting the divisions among 
different regulators. 
A second change in the context within which regulators have found 
themselves operating during the implementation stage that was conducive to a 
watering down of the Dodd-Frank rules is change in the role of Congress. While the 
involvement of Congress following the bailouts of 2008 played a central role in 
generating momentum in support of broadening the regulation of derivatives markets, 
Congress has played an active role during the implementation stage of trying to 
weaken the regulation of derivatives markets. A key reason for the change were the 
elections that enabled the Republican Party to to take control over the House of 
Representatives in January 2011, including the key Congressional Committees 
(House Financial Services Committee and House Agriculture Committee) overseeing 
the work of the CFTC and SEC. During this stage, Republican Congressmen have 
come to identify in the regulation of derivatives - and Dodd-Frank more generally – 
an important target against the Obama administration.  
Overall, at least 29 bills have been introduced within Congress in the period 
between the passage of Dodd-Frank and June 2015 by Republican Congressmen (but 
in some cases with co-sponsors from the Democratic Party) to delay the 
implementation of Dodd-Frank by regulators (for instance requiring regulators to 
demonstrate they were engaging in real cost-benefit analysis before finalizing rules)11 
or to roll back how regulators were interpreting the Congressional mandate. Rep. 
Maxine Waters described this as a "death by a thousand cuts approach to undermine 
financial reform."12 The fact that the Democratic Party has maintained control of the 
Senate until the end of 2014 and of the White House until the end of 2016 meant that 
the large majority of bills seeking to roll-back derivatives rules have failed to be 
approved or signed into law, but important exceptions remain. 																																																								
11 Garrett, 2011 
12  Zibel & Holzer, 2012 
A particularly significant cut to Dodd-Frank was inflicted by the legislation 
passed by Congress to largely repeal the “push-out” rule - also known as “Lincoln 
Amendment” from the name of its author Sen. Blanche Lincoln -  which required 
banks that act as derivatives dealers to spin off their derivatives trading activities into 
independently capitalized entities outside of the government backstop provided by the 
FDIC deposit insurance and Federal Reserve discount window.  This legislation – 
which included more than 70 out of the 85 lines drafted by a major dealer bank 
(Citigroup)13 - was attached in December 2014 into the catch-all $1.1 trillion 1603-
page federal spending bill meant to finance the government in 2015. Critics of this 
legislation highlighted the parallel with the most important episode in the pre-crisis 
de-regulation of derivatives, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, 
which was also signed into law at the end of the 106th Congress as part of a larger 
11,000 page omnibus appropriations bill.14  
A third set of constraints on the implementation of Dodd-Frank rules that 
strengthened the hand of the critics of the legislation came from the international 
context in which US regulators have found themselves operating. The fact that the US 
has been a first-mover in implementing a regulatory framework for derivatives 
markets ahead of Europe and other major derivatives markets has exposed US 
regulators to criticisms from both the financial industry and Congress that the 
implementation of Dodd-Frank would have put US financial markets at a competitive 
disadvantage vis-à-vis their foreign competitors.15 For instance, both the House 
Agriculture Committee and the House Financial Services Committee held in February 
2011 different hearings where regulators were criticized for introducing rules that 
would cause "hundreds of American companies to take their capital and jobs 
elsewhere" (Rep. Bachus) and that "would literally spell the end of U.S.-based 
																																																								
13 Lipton & Protess, 2013  
14 Ackerman, 2014 
15 Coleman, 2003 
derivatives markets" (Rep. Garrett).16 As a result, US regulators have faced strong 
pressures to avoid the introduction of domestic rules that may undermine the 
competitiveness of US firms. 
Overall, these changes that have occurred in the policymaking process during 
the implementation phase created conditions that could be regarded as conducive to a 
weakening of Dodd-Frank and a strengthening of the hands of those voices within the 
financial industry that had a vested interest in rolling-back derivatives rules. These 
factors in themselves, however, cannot fully explain the direction in which regulators 
have implemented the Congressional mandate. For instance, calls upon regulators to 
avoid introducing rules more stringent than those in place in other jurisdictions have 
often fallen on deaf hears, such as in the case of the decision of regulators to expand 
the extraterritorial scope of Dodd-Frank derivatives rules to avoid the risk of 
regulatory arbitrage.17 In other words, the changes that occurred in the 
implementation stage described in this section have constrained the policy space of 
regulators in implementing Dodd-Frank but they have not completely determined the 
course of action of regulators and their capacity to stand up to the opponents of Dodd-
Frank derivatives rules.. 
In order to investigate the determinants of the implementation of Dodd-Frank 
derivatives rules, the next section will explore how patterns of conflict and 
cooperation among different interest groups that have emerged during the 
implementation phase have influenced the conduct of regulators.  
 
																																																								
16 Holzer, 2011  
17 See Gravelle and Pagliari in this volume.  
3. Mapping Interest Group Conflict and Solidarity in the Regulation of 
Derivatives Markets 
 
As a burgeoning literature on the politics of financial regulation has 
recognized, the financial industry is not just a passive recipient of regulatory policies, 
but it often represents a key force in actively influencing the design of regulatory 
policies.18 However, the financial industry is often neither the only voice mobilizing 
around the design of financial regulatory policies, nor one that is always capable of 
speaking with a single voice. This insight is particularly important when it comes to 
analysing the politics of derivatives regulation.  
Most analyses of the politics of financial regulation have focused on the 
lobbying and self-regulatory initiatives by banks that act as dealers in the derivatives 
markets. This attention is understandable given the significant concentration of OTC 
derivatives markets, with just five banks accounting in 2014 for 95% of the total 
notional derivatives of $302 trillion (J.P. Morgan, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs Group, 
Bank of America and Morgan Stanley).19 Given the significant stream of revenues 
generated by derivatives activities20, it is not surprising that these institutions and 
dealer-dominated international financial associations such as the International Swaps 
Derivatives Association (ISDA) have traditionally mobilized significant resources in 
seeking to shield OTC markets from the reach of regulators.21  
As different studies have highlighted, however, dealer banks are not the only group 
that have mobilized over the design of derivatives rules.22 A second key set of voices 
within the financial community is represented by large derivatives exchanges such as 
CME Group and IntercontinentalExchange (ICE), which are also the owners of 																																																								
18 For a review of this literature, see Young, 2013b 
19 Data from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, cited in Carney, 2014 
20 Greenberger, 2012 
21 Tett, 2009 Tsingou, 2006 McKeen-Edwards & Porter, 2013 
22 Clapp & Helleiner, 2012; Helleiner & Pagliari, 2009; Pagliari & Young, 2013 Helleiner, 2014 
important clearinghouses. In fact, the history of the evolution in regulation of 
derivatives markets has often been characterized as a clash between New York-based 
dealers and Chicago-based exchanges. While the rise of OTC trades occurring 
bilaterally among financial institutions since the 1980s tilted the balance of power 
away from exchanges and in favour of dealer banks,23 Dodd-Frank’s attempt to 
promote greater central clearing and exchange trading of standardized products has 
been interpreted as an opportunity for clearinghouses and exchanges to gain a larger 
share of the derivatives markets.  
A third set of financial actors active in the derivatives policy space is inter-
dealer brokers such as ICAP, Tullett Prebon, BGC Partners, and GFI Group. These 
are financial intermediaries mediating between dealers, or between dealers and other 
wholesale market participants in the markets outside of centralized exchanges, while 
taking commissions for arranging trades. The position of these firms in the markets 
has been threatened by the push of Dodd-Frank and the G20 agenda to have 
standardized transactions executed using electronic platforms, requiring them to 
transform into more closely regulated trading venues and to enter more directly in 
competition with derivatives exchanges. As a result, the financial crisis has also led 
these groups to increase their political mobilization in Washington, as well as 
encouraged the creation of new sectoral associations such as the Wholesale Markets 
Brokers Association of America (WMBAA) and the Swaps and Derivatives Market 
Association (SDMA).24 
A fourth and final set of voices within the financial industry is represented by 
“buy-side” financial firms. This category includes financial firms such as hedge 
funds, asset managers, proprietary trading firms, and insurance companies which 
trade in derivatives primarily to manage financial risks such as interest rate or 
currency hedges, or to take a positional bet on these markets. As a result, the interests 																																																								
23 Clapp & Helleiner, 2012 Tsingou, 2006; Morgan, 2010 
24 Protess, 2011 
of buy-side financial firms have often been in conflict with those of the dealers that 
occupy the opposite side of their transactions, with the former calling for greater 
access, protection, and transparency in the derivatives markets.  
The ecology of business groups that has mobilized around the implementation 
of Dodd-Frank derivatives rules is not, however, limited to financial industry groups.  
A particularly vocal set of interest groups in the post-crisis debates has been non-
financial firms that rely on derivatives to hedge everyday risk, such as commodity 
price swings and interest rate fluctuations. These firms have mobilized in response to 
the crisis through a variety of existing sectoral associations as well as through a newly 
created umbrella group called the “Coalition for Derivatives End-Users”. Among 
non-financial groups, particularly significant has been the lobbying by energy and 
commodity groups (both producers or large users), including a number of large 
energy and commodity companies such as BP, Royal Dutch Shell, and Cargill which 
straddle the line between end-user and swap dealers.25  While formally supporting the 
introduction of a new regulatory framework for derivatives markets brought forward 
by Dodd-Frank, commercial end-users have primarily mobilized to seek exemptions 
from these same rules. In the word of the National Association of Corporate 
Treasurers: “Don't throw us in the same paddy wagon as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac 
and AIG". 26 But other non-financial groups, in particular agricultural and commodity 
firms which have been mostly exposed to volatility in the price of agricultural 
products and other commodities in the years before the crisis, have also lobbied in 
favour of tougher rules against speculative activities in commodity derivatives 
markets, thus more directly clashing with the interests of financial firms.27 
Finally, a sixth set of societal actors that have mobilized during the 
implementation of Dodd-Frank include voices outside the business community 
altogether. These voices include a wide and diverse range of consumer protection 																																																								
25 Leff & Doering, 2011 Meyer, 2010 Baltimore, 2012 
26 Bunge, 2010b  
27 Helleiner, this volume. see also Clapp & Helleiner, 2012 
associations, trade unions, faith-based organizations, environmental NGOs, and 
NGOs with a specific focus on financial reforms, such as Better Markets and 
Americans for Financial Reforms. These voices have generally mobilized in support 
of more stringent interpretation of the rules implemented within Dodd-Frank and in 
opposition to the financial industry.  
Existing studies have illustrated how the design of Dodd-Frank by Congress 
reignited a number of long-standing cleavages within the interest group community as 
well as generated new ones. To what extent have conflict among different interest 
groups also characterized the implementation of Dodd-Frank derivatives rules? 
Figure 1 below presents a breakdown of the distribution across these six 
different groups of all the firms and associations that have lobbied the SEC and the 
CFTC during the implementation of Dodd-Frank derivatives rules between 2010 and 
2014. More specifically, this figure maps the identity of the groups that have either 
sending a comment letter in response to a public consultation or held an official 
meeting with these regulatory agencies to lobby over a proposed derivative rule.28 
While this data in isolation does not capture the extent to which different groups were 
listened to by regulators during the implementation of Dodd-Frank derivatives rules, 
the purpose of this exercise is to provide a systematic map of the diversity of groups 
that have mobilized during this phase. 
 
																																																								
28 This analysis follows on the approach adopted in previous work co-authored with Kevin (Young 
Pagliari & Young, 2014; Young & Pagliari, 2015; Pagliari & Young, 2015). In order to map the 
diversity of voices that have between regulators and different stakeholders, I have generated a new 
database containing 2781 comment letters sent by stakeholders to the SEC and CFTC in response to 
100 proposed rules released by these two regulatory agencies between 2010 and 2014 to implement the 
derivatives rules included in Dodd-Frank, as well as the transcripts of 1331 recorded meetings between 
representatives of one these two regulatory bodies and stakeholders on the design of these rules. For 
each of these letters and transcripts of meetings, I have coded the sectoral identity of the group 
lobbying over derivatives regulation. I have limited my analysis to individual letters and transcripts of 
meetings from organizations, thus not analyzing the lobbying by individuals writing in an individual 
capacity (e.g. concerned citizens or independent researchers). Overall, this coding has revealed how 
1631 different groups and policymakers have lobbied the CFTC and SEC over derivatives rules, with 
1160 groups belonging to one of the 6 categories (71%). 
  
Figure 1 – Firms lobbying CFTC and SEC over derivatives rules (2010-2014) 
 
 
This figure highlights how the mobilization of interest groups in the 
implementation stage has certainly not been limited to the derivative dealers that have 
dominated most analysis of pre-crisis derivatives regulation. In terms of sheer number 
of organizations (Figure 1 on the left), banks represent only 10% of the 1160 different 
firms and associations across the six different groups that have lobbied regulators 
over the implementation of Dodd-Frank derivatives rules. In fact, more than half of 
all the groups that have mobilized in this domain come from outside the financial 
industry entirely. 
While this figure provides a good indication of the population of firms that 
have mobilized over the implementation of derivatives rules, the resources that 
different groups have deployed in lobbying regulators has varied significantly across 
different groups. In particular, this analysis reveals how financial industry 
stakeholders account for more than half of the comment letters sent in response to a 
public consultation (Figure 1 in the middle) and almost more than three quarters of all 
the meetings with regulators (Figure 1 on the right) held by the SEC and CFTC over 
derivatives rules during this period. 
Moreover, when we analyze the groups that have most frequently lobbied the 
CFTC and SEC during this period (Figure 2), 12 of the top 20 groups are derivative 
dealers and organizations closely representing this group, while only one group 
comes from outside the financial industry (the NGO Better Markets). 
 
Figure 2 – Groups most frequently lobbying (meetings + letters) the CFTC and 
SEC over derivatives rules (2010-2014) 
 
 
 
The diversity of actors mobilizing in this domain should, however, not be 
equated with a diversity of views. In the same way that the post-crisis regulation of 
derivatives has ignited new and old cleavages among firms and associations from 
different segments of the derivatives markets, it has also created opportunities for the 
emergence of new alliances across different segments of the business community. In 
particular, overlaps in the interests of different groups have emerged around common 
demands such as delaying the implementation of the requirements and limiting 
market disruption created by the new rules, as well as more specific regulatory 
interventions that undermined common sources of profits. 
In order to illustrate the alliances that emerged during the implementation of Dodd-
Frank derivatives rules, Figure 3 below maps all the instances in which different firms 
and associations have lobbied together the SEC and CFTC by co-signing a response 
to a regulatory consultation or jointly meeting a SEC or CFTC official.  
 
Figure 3: Network of groups lobbying over SEC and CFTC derivatives rules29  
 
																																																								
29 This network visualization only presents those groups that have lobbied together with another group 
at least once during the implementation of Dodd-Frank derivatives rules. The color and shape 
represents the family the different groups belong to, the size represents the frequency of lobbying. The 
thickness of the ties between different nodes represent the number of times different groups have 
lobbied together. Only the labels of the 20 groups lobbying most frequently are included. 
  
While the sectoral identity of a firm or association represent the primary 
determinant in the choice of allies, this network visualization reveals how a number 
of groups have reached across the sectoral divide in lobbying regulators. In particular, 
it is notable how dealer banks occupied a central position in the corporate networks, 
being able to form alliances both with buy-side actors and with 
exchanges/clearinghouses.  
But alliances have also emerged between financial and non-financial voices. 
In particular, financial buy-side side firms that enter the market to hedge certain 
financial positions have in a number of occasions lobbied together with non-financial 
end-users. More broadly, the opposition of non-financial end-users to measures that 
would have increased the costs of accessing derivatives markets has brought their 
demands to often overlap with a number of financial industry voices. Individual firms 
(such as BP) and associations such as the US Chamber of Commerce, ISDA, and the 
Working Group of Commercial Energy Firms have played a key role in bridging the 
lobbying efforts of financial and non-financial groups. The network visualization also 
reveals how the non-financial end-user community is not a cohesive set of voices. In 
particular, agricultural and commodity firms that have mobilized in favour of tougher 
rules against speculative activities in commodity derivatives markets have frequently 
joined forces with non-governmental organizations (for instance through the 
“Commodity Markets Oversight Coalition”).30 
The centrality of the banking industry and the relative importance of different 
groups in the regulatory policymaking over the implementation of derivatives rules 
has, however, varied significantly across different issues. Figure 4 illustrates the 
percentage of lobbying initiatives (both meetings and letters) from the six groups 
across different set of regulatory proposals released by the CFTC and SEC during the 
implementation of Dodd-Frank derivatives rules. This figure reveals how banking 
community has represented the largest group mobilizing only on a limited number of 
issues with significant implications for their profits, such as the cross-border 
application of derivatives rules. In the majority of consultations, groups outside of the 
banking community have been the ones lobbying most frequently. For example, inter-
dealer brokers have been the most active group on the regulation of trade execution 
platforms (SEF) and exchanges/clearinghouses have dominated debates on the 
regulation of clearinghouses, while buy-side firms have been the most active group on 
the implementation of the trading requirement. The balance between financial and 
non-financial groups has also varied significantly across issues, with non-financial 
firms representing the group lobbying most frequently on issues such as the definition 
of what firms should be covered by the regulation, margin requirements, exemptions 
from clearing, and position limits for commodity derivatives. 
The breakdown of the mobilization of interest groups across different 
individual issues also reveals the fragility and ad-hoc basis of a number of coalitions 
																																																								
30 Clapp & Helleiner, 2012 
emerged across issues. For instance, while non-business groups have frequently 
lobbied together with NGOs on the regulation of position limits, the same alliance has 
not emerged over other issues such as clearing exemptions, reporting requirements 
and margin requirements, where non-business groups have instead joined forces with 
financial buy-side users and other financial actors. Similar variations in the choice of 
lobbying partners can found in the coalitions linking together different segments of 
the financial industry across different issues related to the regulation of derivatives. 
 
 
  
Figure 4 – Numbers and links among groups lobbying the CFTC and SEC 
(meetings + letters) across different derivatives rule-making (2010-2014)31 
																																																								
31 The external circle in this chord diagram represents the percentage of all the lobbying activities 
(meetings with regulators and responses to consultations) for each issue conducted from each of the six 
groups analyzed in the chapter. The links between different groups represent the instances in which 
each group has lobbied together with a firm or association representing a different group. 
 
  
How do these findings regarding the variations in the extent of the 
mobilization of different sectors and the alliances among firms and associations from 
different sectors matter in shaping the implementation of Dodd-Frank derivatives 
rules? Neo-pluralist scholarship has theorized how the business community’s ability 
to maintain a cohesive position influences its capacity to shape regulatory policies.32 
In particular, the presence of divisions across different segments of the financial 
industry as well the opposition from groups outside finance have been understood to 
constrain the capacity of financial groups to resist the imposition of more stringent 																																																								
32  Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball, & Lebon, 2009; Falkner, 2007; Lindblom, 1977; Roemer-
Mahler, 2013  
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regulatory requirement. As different groups deploying resources battle each other, 
regulators have greater policy space to exploit divisions across different firms in 
pursuit of their own agenda and to withstand calls for rules to be watered down.33 
Conversely, the leverage of financial firms over regulators is understood to be 
augmented by when these firms are able to join forces with other segments of the 
financial industry and of the broader business community through the creation of 
formal coalitions or informal alliances.34  
To what extent can these insights concerning the impact of cohesion and 
contestation within the business community also shed light on the implementation of 
Dodd-Frank derivatives rules?  In order to probe this hypothesis, the rest of the 
chapter will investigate three key regulatory policies that have characterized the 
implementation of Dodd-Frank derivatives rules. The analysis of these three case 
studies will focus in particular on assessing to what extent the implemention of 
different Dodd-Frank derivative rules can be linked to to the balance between the 
different stakeholders that have mobilized in opposition or in support to different 
regulatory proposals. 
 
 
4. Definition of Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants 
One of the most fundamental changes to the regulation of derivatives markets 
brought by Dodd-Frank consisted of the decision to bring a large range of market 
players involved in the trading of derivatives under the oversight of US regulators. 
But what market players should be captured within the regulatory net casted by Dodd-
Frank’s derivatives rules and required to comply with its prudential and business 
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conduct requirements? Dodd-Frank instructed regulators to cast the net widely to 
include both those firms marking a market on swaps (defined as “swap dealers”) as 
well as those firms which maintained “substantial positions” in swap markets that 
could have “serious adverse effects on the financial stability of the United States 
banking system or financial markets" (defined as “major swap participants”). The 
legislation passed by Congress, however, left to the CFTC and SEC the responsibility 
of jointly defining what entities would be captured by these two categories. 
A senior CFTC official declared at the beginning of the implementation stage 
that these definitions would be "extremely broad" in order to fulfill the Congressional 
mandate “to decrease risk in the system and improve transparency by trying to make 
sure that no one's evading the system and that we've got full coverage."35 This broad 
interpretation of the Congressional mandate has, however, been challenged by a broad 
range of firms seeking not to be captured by the regulatory net casted by regulators.36 
As the CFTC Commissioner Chilton commented: “One thing that's been evident  […] 
is that a lot of folks think that the line for regulation starts right behind them".37 In 
particular, demands to be excluded from the definition of swap dealer and major swap 
participant were advanced by a large number of financial firms that included 
employee benefit plans, farm credit system institutions, Federal Home Loan Banks, 
small and mid-size banks, life insurance firms, asset managers, and hedge funds,38 as 
well as numerous non-financial end-users. For instance, the Coalition for Derivatives 
End-Users pressed for a “strong, clear exemption for end-users” on the grounds that 
“end-user hedges do not create risk that demands and justifies the type of regulation 
imposed upon swap dealers".39  
Among non-financial companies, energy firms were particularly vocal in 
mobilizing against the proposal by the CFTC requiring firms with a yearly gross 																																																								
35 Scheid, 2010d 
36 Rampton, 2010 
37 Rampton & Doering, 2010 
38 CFTC & SEC, 2012, p. 30605 
39 Scheid, 2010c  
notional amount above $100m to register as swap dealer40, claiming that a single 
swap to hedge a large container cargo of crude oil would have exceed this threshold.41 
Energy firms called for this threshold to be increased more than thirty-times.42 This 
increase in the threshold was opposed by the CFTC. Its chairman Gary Gensler cited 
Enron’s role in derivatives markets before its 2001 collapse in justifying the extension 
of the rules also to some non-bank players that acted as dealers, stating that if large 
energy firms were exempted from these rules, “we could look back to 2012 and call it 
the BP loophole instead of the Enron loophole”.43  
Despite the opposition from Gensler, the pleading of commercial end-users for 
a higher threshold found support within Congress.44 In January 2012, the House 
Agriculture Committee approved bipartisan legislation (H.R. 3527 “Protecting Main 
Street End-Users From Excessive Regulation Act”) to narrow the definition of swap 
dealers and explicitly exempt end users. While this bill did not come to a vote in the 
Senate, the vast opposition to its initial rule and the bipartisan pressures from 
Congress combined to create significant pressures upon regulators to revise their 
approach. In March the CFTC 2012 bumped the threshold for mandatory registration 
from $100 million to up to $8 billion, a threshold comfortably higher than the trading 
volume of most energy companies. 45 
Beyond increasing the threshold for firms to qualify as swap dealer, additional 
amendments to the rules initially proposed by the SEC and CFTC have narrowed the 
regulatory net casted by Dodd-Frank by exempting a number of trades and entities. 
First, the CFTC had initially introduced in 2012 a lower threshold when trades with  
“special entities” such as federal agencies, employee benefit plans or state, city, 
county or municipality (including municipally owned public power systems) would 																																																								
40 CFTC & SEC, 2010 
41 Protess, 2012 
42 BP, Constellation Energy and Shell pitched a $3.5 billion threshold, while the Coalition of Physical 
Energy Companies proposed a $3 billion figure. See Scheid, 2011b 
43 Scheid, 2012a 
44 O’Neil, 2011  
45 CFTC & SEC, 2012. The final rule stated that the threshold would go down to $3 billion after five 
years unless regulators had suggested a different threshold after a study.  
be required to come under the purview of the regulation ($25 million vs. $8 billion). 
This lower threshold had been opposed by non-bank dealers such as regional utilities, 
natural gas distributors, and independent power generators,46 which also convinced 
the House of Representatives to pass a bill in June 2013 (H.R. 1038 Public Power 
Risk Management Act of 2013) to exempt firms conducting deals with special entities 
from mandatory registration as a swap dealer. In May 2014, the CFTC amended its 
proposed rules to exclude from the de minimis threshold for dealers those swaps 
concluded with “special entities”. 
Second, the CFTC revised its earlier proposed rule to exclude from the de-
minimis threshold those transactions conducted between affiliates within the same 
company. This narrowing of the scope of the rules followed the requests not only 
from financial stakeholders47 but also from a number of non-financial corporations 
which centralized derivatives transactions for the different business units within the 
corporate group in a financial subsidiary that thus face the risk of being designated as 
swap dealer or major swap participants.48   
Third, a similar exception was also given for swap transactions conducted by 
cooperatives on behalf of the members, including cooperative associations of 
producers and cooperative financial entities such as the Federal Home Loan Banks 
and the Farm Credit System institutions that are the largest group of lenders to US 
agriculture which received significant support within the US House and Senate 
Agriculture Committee.49 
These different exceptions and changes introduced to the definition of dealer 
and major swap participants had the effect of significantly limiting the net casted by 
Dodd-Frank. While at the beginning of the implementation stage Gensler predicted 
that more than 200 firms would have to register with the CFTC, as of 1 March 2017, 																																																								
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47 CFTC & SEC, 2012, p. 30624 
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49 CFTC & SEC, 2012, p. 30625 Stebbins, 2012 
only 104 entities had registered with the CFTC as swap dealers and only 2 as major 
swap participants,50 including only three energy and commodity firms (BP, Cargill 
and Shell). 
The consumer advocacy group Better Markets described the definitions of 
dealers and major swap participants set by US regulators as “an indefensible retreat 
from financial reform" and as “a poster child for ... the influence that the financial 
industry has at the regulatory agencies".51 However, as the analysis above suggested, 
the lobbying leading to a weakening of the scope of the regulation was neither only 
nor primarily from financial industry groups. On the contrary, major dealer banks 
remained among the few voices (together with NGOs such as Americans for 
Financial Reform and Better Markets) cautioning against the narrowing down of the 
regulatory net and to exclude potential competitors.52 The analysis in this case 
suggests that this hollowing out of the definition of which actors should be covered 
by the Dodd-Frank rules reflected the lobbying efforts from a much larger front which 
included commercial end-users and financial buy-side firms that successfully opposed 
an expansive interpretation of the Congressional mandate. 
 
5. Clearinghouses 
In order to mitigate the systemic risk emanating from the default of a 
counterparty in an OTC derivatives transaction, Dodd-Frank mandated that all 
derivatives recognized as sufficiently standardized should be cleared into 
clearinghouse. While Dodd-Frank elevated clearinghouses to central players in the 
new market architecture, concerns soon emerged that clearinghouses might 																																																								
50  The list is available on the CFTC website:  
http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/registerswapdealer 
51 Wagner, 2012  
52 For instance, SIFMA was described in a meeting as advocating “that the exclusion should not be so 
broad that it permits corporate end users of swaps to accumulate very large swap positions without 
becoming major swap participants.” 
http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/ExternalMeetings/dfmeeting_020411_518 
concentrate financial risk rather than mitigating it. As Federal Reserve Chairman Ben 
Bernanke put it, quoting Mark Twain: if you're going to put all your eggs in one 
basket, "Watch that basket!".53 As a result, Dodd-Frank (Section 745b) directed 
regulators to design a number of regulatory requirements for clearinghouses.   
One key policy debate that has emerged during the implementation phase 
revolved around the issue of who should be given access to clearinghouse. During the 
design of Dodd-Frank, the dominant position gained by the major dealers in a leading 
clearinghouse for credit default swaps (ICE US Trust) raised concerns among 
lawmakers that banks could exploit this position to narrow the scope of products 
considered eligible for clearing in order to keep these products traded in less 
transparent and more profitable OTC markets.54  In order to address this risk, Dodd-
Frank mandated regulators to establish eligibility standards for members of 
clearinghouses to ensure “fair and open access” to clearing services.55    
In order to achieve this objective, in October 2010 the CFTC prohibited a 
clearinghouse from requiring more than $50 million in capital from any entity seeking 
to become a swaps clearing member, a threshold significantly lower than the 
minimum membership requirements in place in different major clearinghouses.56 
Wall Street derivative dealers mobilized against the proposed threshold, claiming it 
did not take into account the need to ensure that clearing members were large enough 
to be able to handle the wind-down of large trading positions in a default scenario. In 
the words of Deutsche Bank managing director: "A [clearinghouse] is as good as its 
members … The last one you bring in may actually be increasing the risk”.57 Large 
dealers also have opposed opening up clearinghouse membership to smaller members 
on the ground that these lacked "critical swap-market expertise".58 As a result, major 
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dealer associations called for a much higher threshold than the one proposed by the 
CFTC ($300 million in the case of SIFMA, or $1 billion in the case of ISDA). On this 
issue, the position of dealers was supported by the same clearinghouses such as CME, 
LCH, and ICE,59 with the latter arguing that the purpose of Dodd-Frank was to "make 
the financial system more stable", not to promote competition between financial 
institutions.60 
The lobbying by dealer banks and clearinghouses in support of restricting the 
access to CCPs was opposed by a number of voices within the financial industry. For 
instance, the Swaps and Derivatives Market Association (SDMA) - an association 
created in 2008 by a number of inter-dealer brokers, futures commission merchants 
and investment managers - expressed concern about the issue. SDMA argued that in 
the absence of lower membership requirements large dealers would be able to 
maintain control of derivatives clearing organizations and effectively exclude smaller 
dealers and any potential new products they wanted to trade bilaterally, resulting in 
the continuation of “the same, OTC-style, bilateral, closed, untransparent, opaque, 
risky system”. 61 Overall, the $50 million threshold rule proposed by the CFTC was 
supported a number of buy-side actors (such as hedge fund’s Managed Fund 
Association and Citadel), interdealer brokers (Swaps and Derivatives Markets 
Association), and voices outside of the financial industry (Better Markets, AFL-
CIO).62   
The divisions that emerged within the financial industry on this issue widened 
the policy space for regulators to confirm in November 2011 the proposed $50 
million threshold. The CFTC rejected the claim by dealers that this “would lead to a 
[clearinghouse] having to admit clearing members that are unable to participate in the 
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default management process”.63  Moreover, the fact that during this period dealers 
and clearinghouses were not successful in soliciting action by Congress in favour of a 
higher threshold than the one proposed by the CFTC allowed regulators to maintain 
that a higher threshold “would be contrary to the Congressional mandate for open 
access to clearing”.64 
The debate over the rules governing the access to clearinghouse was not the 
only contested issue surrounding the governance of clearinghouses that emerged 
during the implementation of Dodd-Frank. Congress identified the nature of 
clearinghouses as profit-seeking entities as creating incentives for these firms to 
bolster the volume of activities by accepting swaps not safe to be cleared or to lower 
risk management standards. As a result, Dodd-Frank gave regulators the task to 
define a series of prudential requirements for CCPs to bolster the safety of 
clearinghouses.  
Similarly to the debate on membership criteria, the rules proposed by the 
CFTC pitted different segments of the financial industry against each other. However, 
the impact of these prudential requirements in determining the distribution of costs in 
the event of a failure of a clearing member meant that this cleavage ran primarily 
between the clearinghouses and its members, rather than between large and small 
clearinghouse members. 
On one side, clearinghouses generally rejected the notion that their activities 
could create a potential threat to the financial stability and opposed the calls for more 
stringent prudential requirements. On the other side, clearing members as well as 
large financial buy-side firms have often called for clearinghouses to have more of 
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their own money at risk to backstop potential failures by any of their clearing 
members, rather than distributing these losses to non-defaulting clearing members.65 
This cleavage was clearly in display when the CFTC proposed rules requiring 
clearinghouses to maintain sufficient financial resources to withstand the default by 
the member creating the largest financial exposure in order to meet their obligations 
to their clearing members. While this proposal was supported by different 
clearinghouses,66 financial industry associations such as the Futures Industry 
Association and ISDA, as well as pro-reform groups such as Better Markets and 
Americans for Financial Reform, lobbied the CFTC to increase this requirement and 
require clearinghouses to maintain resources sufficient to withstand the default of the 
two clearing members representing the largest financial exposure to the clearing 
house.67 Derivative dealers also asked the CFTC to impose capital requirements upon 
the same clearinghouses, a measure that was opposed by the major clearinghouses 
that claimed capital requirements would be unnecessary.68 In both cases, regulators 
took advantage of the policy space created by the conflict between different key 
stakeholders and decided not to deviate from their original proposal. 
Regulators have been more likely to cave in to financial industry pressures 
when facing a cohesive opposition front to their proposed rules. For instance, the 
CFTC revised its proposed rules to allow clearinghouses to include US Treasuries and 
other high quality sovereign bonds to meet their liquidity obligation, a measure 
supported both by major clearinghouses and broader industry associations, but 
opposed only by pro-reform NGOs such as Americans for Financial Reform.  
Overall, unlike the previous case, the implementation of the rules governing 
clearinghouses has not been characterized by a significant backing down of regulators 
from their initial interpretation of the Congressional mandate. The analysis of this 																																																								
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case presented in this section highlight the lack of a cohesive front among financial 
firms opposing the proposed regulation. This fragmentation in the position of the 
financial industry and the limited involvement of Congress on this issue created the 
policy space for regulators not to deviate from their original position. 
 
 
6. Swap Execution Facilities 
Another key objective of Dodd-Frank was to inject greater transparency in the 
derivatives markets by shifting the trading of a greater part of these markets away 
from the over-the-counter markets and towards centralized trading venues.   
Recognizing that most swaps would be unsuitable for trading on traditional exchanges 
such as those dominating the trading of futures, Section 723 of Dodd-Frank 
introduced a new category called “swap execution facility” (SEF). At the same time, 
the vagueness of the definition of SEF provided by Dodd-Frank meant that regulators 
were left with much of the responsibility of determining what actors would be 
allowed to compete for a share of the lucrative business of trading and brokering 
swaps. 
It is therefore not a surprise that the definition of SEFs has been the subject of 
intense lobbying activities. As a market participant stated: "Everyone in the world has 
got a different view about what a SEF is […] Everyone thinks a SEF definitely 
includes them, and so [regulators] are getting lobbied in every direction about who's a 
SEF and who's not a SEF."69   
The development of SEFs was perceived as a threat to the established position 
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of banks that dominated OTC markets by trading directly with their customers or with 
other banks through interdealer brokers. But it also represented a market opportunity 
for many other actors. This included not only deep-pocketed derivatives exchanges 
dominating the trading in smaller market for futures and now coveting a slice of the 
trading of swaps (in particular interest-rate swaps), but also a variety of platforms that 
were used for dealer-to-client trades such as Bloomberg, MarketAxess and Tradeweb, 
as well brokers of swaps between dealers such as such as ICAP, BGC Partners, 
Tradition, GFI and Tullett Prebon. All these actors set as their priority to ensure that 
the definition of SEF crafted by regulators would accommodate their business model 
while limiting competition. 
A first conflict among the different dealer banks, trading platforms, inter-
dealer brokers, and exchanges competing for the control of the trading of swaps 
emerged around the definition of what models of trade execution facilities would be 
consistent with the definition of SEF. High frequency trading firms and pro-
regulation NGOs such as Better Markets and American for Financial Reforms 
supported a definition of SEF that would privilege exchange-like systems where buy 
and sell orders were matched continuously and prices were live on the bid and offer 
sides. According to these groups, this model provided the most accurate valuation of 
the market, reduced systemic risk and resulted in better prices.70 This view remained, 
however, was opposed by the majority of groups within the financial industry. Dealer 
banks, interdealer brokers, and a number of large financial buy-side users that traded 
swaps in very large sizes and that received from banks the capacity to execute highly 
customized deals claimed that the limited standardization of swaps compared to 
future markets made this model unfeasible.71 These groups called upon for regulators 
to accommodate in the definition of SEF also “request-for-quote” models where a 
buy-side firm can request a swap price from only an individual dealer or small 
number of dealers, rather than making this position visible to the entire market.  																																																								
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The vast opposition front to forcing swaps trading into exchange-like 
platforms can explain the direction of the policymaking process during the 
implementation. The CFTC quickly shelved an initial plan requiring swaps trading 
more than 10 times a day to be executed on SEFs publicly listing bids and offers 
similar to stock market order books.72 The rule proposed by the CFTC allowed 
instead SEFs to adopt a “request for quote” system, thus allowing market participants 
to access multiple participants but not the entire market. Subsequent amendments to 
these rules have even further distanced which firms could qualify as a SEF from the 
type of exchange trading characteristic of the futures markets.  
The original CFTC proposal stated that voice-based execution of transactions 
was inconsistent with the Dodd-Frank mandate to increase pre-trade transparency, 
and required instead trading to be arranged on open electronic platforms. This 
proposal saw the emergence of a conflict among trading platforms. On the one hand, 
the trading platforms parts of Swaps and Derivatives Market Association supported 
the ban, stating "You can't trade swaps by two paper cups and a string and have pre-
trade price transparency". 73  On the other hand, major interdealer brokers such as 
ICAP, GFI Group and Tullet Prebon, which conducted much of their business in 
matching buyers and sellers over the phone, claimed that banning voice brokering 
would cause disruption to the markets.74 Importantly, the continuation of voice 
brokering was also supported by dealers as well as large end-users such as the 
Working Group of Commercial Energy Firms.75 The mobilization of these groups 
contributed towards tilting the balance in favour of the continuation of voice 
brokering, as the CFTC came to revise its previous ruling to allow a SEF to negotiate 
trades away from screens.  
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A third key dispute surrounding the definition of SEF regarded the number of 
counterparties that should be able to access these platforms. Dodd-Frank stated that 
SEFs should be open to “multiple” participants, while leaving to regulators the 
responsibility to define how this term should be interpreted. At the beginning of the 
implementation phase, the CFTC stated that the text of Dodd-Frank was inconsistent 
with the “one-to-many” platforms on which a single dealer was the counterparty to all 
swap contracts executed through the system, thus blocking the attempt of dealer 
banks to have their in-house customer-to-dealer trading systems recognized as SEFs. 
Instead, the CFTC requested SEFs to send a quote to buy or sell a specific instrument 
to no less than five market participants.76  
This threshold was criticized from different sides. On the one hand, pro-
reform NGOs, high frequency trading firms, and brokers represented by the Swap and 
Derivatives Market Association claimed that restricting the requirements to five 
market participants would allow the continuation of semi-private pre-arranged deals 
with a few favoured participants to the exclusion of the rest. They demanded instead 
that a request for quote to be transmitted to all market participants in order to increase 
price competition.77  
On the opposite side, major dealer banks and their associations argued that 
sending out a request for quote to a large number of parties would compromise the 
liquidity in the swap markets, as market participants would be afraid to make their 
positions known to others.78 The opposition to the threshold of five quotes extended 
well beyond dealer banks and it also included also a large front of platforms and 
interdealer brokers (Tradeweb, Bloomberg. MarketAxess, WMBAA), buy-side firms 
(Blackrock, MetLife, Freddie Mac), exchanges (CME), as well as non-financial end-
users represented by the Coalition for Derivatives End Users.79 This coalition was 																																																								
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able to achieve significant support within the House of Representatives Agriculture 
Committee, which passed unanimously a legislative proposal (H.R. 2586 Swap 
Execution Facility Clarification Act) that would have prevented regulators from 
requiring SEFs to have a minimum number of participants receiving a bid or offer.80  
These pressures from a broad front of interest groups, with the support from 
Congress, contributed to a change of direction from the CFTC which in May 2013 
“recognize[d] commenters’ concerns about the proposed five market participant 
requirement” and amended its rules to require that only two firms bid on swaps orders 
on “request for quote” platforms.81  
Overall, despite Gensler ‘s claim that the reforms would represent “a 
significant shift toward market transparency from the status quo”82, the definition of 
“swap execution facility” crafted during implementation of Dodd-Frank has 
safeguarded a number of elements that characterized the trading of derivatives before 
the crisis and which limited the transparency in these markets. The explanation of this 
outcome presented in this case study highlights how, although the centralization of 
swaps trading in SEFs has often been described by regulators as shifting the balance 
of power between banks and users of derivatives and being designed to “tip some of 
the information advantage from Wall Street to Main Street",83 the banks and users of 
derivatives have often joined forces in opposing more radical changes to existing 
trading practices. 
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7. Conclusion 
As argued in the introduction to this chapter, the regulation of financial 
markets often evolves in a cyclical fashion. alternating between periods of de-
regulation and those where financial rules are tightened. In the case of derivatives 
markets, the passage of Dodd-Frank reversed the direction undertaken by US 
authorities in the previous two decades and expanded the control of regulatory 
authorities over these markets. This chapter has investigated to what extent the 
regulatory pendulum has swung back during the implementation of Dodd-Frank 
derivatives rules. The analysis of the rules passed by the CFTC to implement the 
provisions of Dodd-Frank concerning the regulation of derivatives markets suggests 
that the implementation phase has brought to a halt the tightening in the regulation of 
derivatives markets that was set in motion by financial crisis.  
The chapter highlighted how the process of defining which actors should be 
covered by the key requirements at the core of Dodd-Frank led regulators to exempt a 
large number of non-financial as well as financial entities, thus limiting the scope of 
the regulatory net casted by Dodd-Frank. Along the same lines, the analysis of the 
definition of the new swap execution facilities demonstrated how a number of pre-
crisis trading practices that Congress had challenged in drafting Dodd-Frank will 
continue under the new rules. At the same, this whittling down of Dodd-Frank 
derivatives rules have not been uniform, with a number of instances where the rules 
implemented were not significantly watered down during the implementation. For 
instance, the analysis of the implementation of the rules governing clearinghouses has 
not been characterized by a significant departure from the direction set by Congress in 
the drafting of Dodd-Frank. 
In order to explain the uneven pattern in the implementation of Dodd-Frank 
derivatives rules, this study has investigated the lobbying of different stakeholders 
within and outside the financial industry during the implementation phase. While 
most analyses of the regulation of derivatives markets before the crisis have focused 
on the dealer banks that dominate OTC markets, the analysis in this chapter has 
highlighted the significant diversity of groups that have competed to influence the 
action of regulators during the implementation stage. This study has highlighted how 
the implementation stage has been characterized by the emergence of a number of 
formal and informal coalitions bringing together different segments of the financial 
industry, as well as between financial and non-financial actors. The case studies have, 
in particular, revealed how the capacity of regulators to implement the Congressional 
mandate in an expansive way has been hindered by the emergence of large opposition 
fronts linking different sectors that contested the reach of the rules proposed by 
regulators. Besides signaling the breadth of the opposition to the proposed rules, the 
presence of a unified front comprising groups from a variety of sectors has increased 
the likelihood that that Congress would exercise pressures on regulators and would 
revise their mandate.84  
At the same time, the analysis revealed that divergences between the interests 
of different segments of the financial industry as well as between the broader business 
community varied significantly across different regulatory proposals, as well as on 
different aspects of the same rules. The presence of disagreements across interest 
groups in some instances created policy space for regulators to carry forward their 
preferred policy and to withstand calls for their proposed rules to be watered down.  
These results provide empirical support to those studies that have identified a 
key influence over the design of financial regulation to be the diversity of views 
within the financial industry and ecology of interests groups. While the competition 
among different groups within and outside the financial industry often represents an 
important check on the influence of financial industry players, the centrality of 
different groups in the lobbying networks represents a key source of influence. From 
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this perspective, while bank dealers that have dominated the politics of OTC 
derivatives markets in the years before the crisis have been only one among a wide 
range groups that have mobilize during the implementation phase, their capacity to 
link their interests to those of different financial and non-financial groups is an 
important element explaining the outcome of the regulatory process. For these 
reasons, the chapter also calls for greater attention to be paid to the origins of the 
patterns of conflict and solidarity within the financial regulatory policymaking, and in 
particular the capacity of major financial institutions to gain support from a wide 
range of voices outside and inside finance.  
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